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 Introduction: Unauthorized Immigrants and the Rhetoric 
of Criminalization 
 Contemporary criminological research on immigration can arguably be characterized 
by its single-minded focus on dispelling the popular misconceptions that immigra-
tion causes crime, and that immigrants are prone to criminality (e.g.,  Graif & 
Sampson,  2009 ; Sampson,  2008 ; Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls,  1999 ; Wadsworth, 
 2010 ). A brief review of the literature in this area reveals suffi cient depth and breadth 
of study by researchers of signifi cant reputation—from Robert Sampson ( 2008 , 
 2009 ) to Ramiro Martinez (Chap.  8 )—that the academic debate in this area has 
largely moved past any question of a connection between immigration and crime, to 
determining how robust a protective factor a concentrated immigrant population pro-
vides against crime (Velez & Lyons,  2012 ), refi ning theories of how this protective 
factor operates (Hagan, Levi, & Dinovitzer,  2008 ), and determining its variance 
along spatial, ethnic and cultural lines ( Chap.  8 ). 
 In contrast to this scholarly consensus, popular and political rhetoric on immi-
grant criminality appears in recent years to have, if anything, doubled down on the 
very false equivalency that these scholars sought to settle. Witness the assertions by 
national political fi gures, in publicly televised debates, such as Arizona Governor 
Jan Brewer’s that “the majority [of unauthorized border crossers] are coming here 
and they’re bringing drugs…they’re extorting people and they’re terrorizing the 
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families,” or one-time Republican presidential primary frontrunner Herman Cain’s 
promise to “build an electrifi ed fence on the border with Mexico [and] use military 
troops ‘with real guns and real bullets’ to stop intruders” (Gabriel & Wyatt,  2011 ; 
Sanchez,  2010 ). In this rhetoric, popularly held ideas on the inherent criminality of 
“illegal immigrants” are extended to encompass multiple dimensions of such severe 
and intentional harm (extortion, drug smuggling, terrorism) as to justify preemptive 
summary execution. 
 Such rhetoric is a far cry from the settled academic consensus; nor does it bear 
easy dismissal as the narrow opinion of nativist extremists (on the contrary, these 
are the publicly expressed opinions of elected offi cials and nationally prominent 
politicians), or mere lip-service to a nativist base; in many states and localities, leg-
islative activism and offi cial policy has followed this rhetoric, most notably in the 
form of Arizona’s notorious SB1070 (Chap.  2 ) and copycat legislation in Alabama, 
Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah (Castillo,  2011 ; Gray,  2011 ; Guterbock 
et al.,  2009 ; Pearce,  2011 ). While the federal legislative process on immigration 
may appear stalled, the Obama administration’s recent high-profi le amnesty for 
“dreamers” belies a fl urry of restrictionist immigration activity on the part of the 
executive branch, from steadily rising annual numbers of forcible deportations, to 
the nearly universal rollout of the Secure Communities program (Kuck Immigration 
Partners,  2010 ). 
 Why this apparent disconnect between scholarly consensus and popular rhetoric, 
between empirical research and offi cial policy? I argue that the criminalization of 
immigrants can be understood best as a function of the economic context in which 
both immigration, and the punishment that follows logically as a societal response 
to criminalization, take place. Large-scale immigration to the continental USA—
particularly that which took place over the Southern land border from the 1990s 
through the middle 2000s—was driven primarily by America’s growing need for 
low- and semi-skilled labor in the service economy during this period, as well as the 
income differentials in this sector between source countries in Central and South 
America and the US labor market (Massey,  2009 ). The same period saw the advent 
of “hyperincarceration” 1 ( Wacquant,  2009 ,  2010a ) in the USA, with both rates of 
incarceration, and the raw population of the nation’s penal archipelago, rising to 
unprecedented levels year upon year. In Rusche and Kirchheimer’s ( 1939 ) theory of 
the political economy of punishment, we fi nd a framework that not only provides 
insight into these trends as separate phenomena, but also allows us to understand 
them as intertwined products of the same market dynamics—dynamics that, in the 
context of the 2007 “Great Recession” and the nativist movement that followed in 
its wake, appear to bring immigration enforcement and penal infrastructure into a 
functional economic relationship unprecedented in the history of either. 
1  Wacquant coined the term as a refi nement of the more commonly used “mass incarceration,” in 
order to indicate that “the expansion and intensifi cation of the activities of the police, courts, and 
prison over the past quarter century … have been  fi nely targeted, fi rst by class, second by that 
disguised brand of ethnicity called race, and third by place” (Wacquant,  2010a , p. 78). 
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 The Political Economy of Punishment: The Social Origins 
and Market Functions of Legal Sanctions 
 Originally posed by Georg Rusche in his 1933 article “Arbeitsmarkt und Strafvollzug 
[Labor Market and Penal Sanction]” (Rusche & Dinwiddie,  1978 ), and later elabo-
rated upon by his co-author Otto Kirchheimer in  Punishment and Social Structure 
(Rusche & Kirchheimer,  1939 ) the political economy of punishment is a theory 
noteworthy for its simplicity. The theory holds that “[e]very system of production 
tends to discover punishments which correspond to its productive relationships” 
(Rusche & Kirchheimer,  1939 , p. 5). While the language of “production” and 
“productive relationships” is indeed Marxian in its orientation, the implications of 
this statement are as much practical as they are critical: the shape of any given soci-
ety’s penal infrastructure, at a particular moment in time, is more a factor of its 
economic arrangements than its jurisprudence. Punishment, and the social appara-
tus for carrying it out, are shaped by market forces and the social context within 
which those forces operate, not by abstract legal principles or the theoretical con-
cerns of criminologists (much to our frequent chagrin). 
 In laying out the evidence for their theory, Rusche and Kirchheimer present a 
historical overview of the changing shape of punishment, mapped against the shift-
ing social and economic relationships of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and 
the Industrial Revolution. In the ensuing years, theorists such as Dario Melossi 
( 1981 ), Nicola Lacey ( 2008 ) and others, have used Rusche and Kirchheimer’s basic 
template to explain the evolution of punishment through the industrial expansion of 
the twentieth century, the rise of automation, the decline of manufacturing, global-
ization, and the contemporary dominance of the service economy (Cavadino & 
Dignan,  2006 ; De Giorgi,  2006 ; Lacey,  2008 ; Melossi & Pavarini,  1981 ). These 
scholars’ respective interpretations of the relationship between contemporary 
macro-economic trends and American mass (or hyper-) incarceration varies, but 
there appears to be general agreement on a few essential points: (1) the dispropor-
tionate racial impact of American imprisonment policies—particularly those imple-
mented as part of the “War on Drugs”—represent the political establishment’s 
efforts to limit and otherwise regulate the participation of historical minorities (par-
ticularly African Americans) in US economic life; (2) the isolation of the impris-
oned from the American labor market makes it “crucially important to grasp the 
way in which the removal of prisoners from the roll of the unemployed [positively] 
distorts the perception of the USA’s economic importance” (Lacey,  2008 , p. 134); 
and (3) “The employment created by the prison system—building construction and 
maintenance, the provision of security technology, and the supervision of  prisoners—
now constitutes a sizeable portion of the US economy” (Lacey,  2008 , p. 135). 
Although it should be noted that Hispanics (arguably the archetypal millenial immi-
grant to the USA) are also disproportionately represented in the American prison 
system, the immigrant detention and deportation system fi lls a parallel and supple-
mental role in limiting and regulating Hispanic (and other) immigrants’ participa-
tion in US economic life—a role that has expanded exponentially on a trajectory 
that mirrors the explosive growth of mass incarceration. 
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 The current study seeks to expand on these fundamental concepts of contempo-
rary political economy of punishment, and further, subjects them to a series of 
empirical tests. While it is a given that the broad generalities of theory elide much 
of the specifi c contextual variation in the historical dynamics that they attempt to 
explain and describe, theory testing requires that these variations be operational-
ized; therefore, I examine the specifi c economic contexts in which state and local 
governments adopt the restrictionist immigration policies and practices that lead to 
detention and deportation—and give the states and localities in question both direct 
and indirect economic stakes in the detention and deportation processes. Looking at 
all 50 US States, I draw data from multiple sources to analyze and specify three 
coherent and mutually distinct state-level factors ( market scale ,  punitive economy , 
and  market pressure ); I then test the correlation of these factors with a fourth factor 
measuring the scale of locally controlled immigration enforcement. Results show a 
signifi cant and strong linear correlation between market scale and local enforce-
ment, and signifi cant weak-to-moderate correlations between punitive economy, 
market pressure and local enforcement. These results suggest that locally driven 
immigration enforcement may be infl uenced by the profi t potential inherent in 
immigrant detention, transportation and deportation operations. I conclude by argu-
ing that this infl uence obscures the public interest missions of local law enforcement 
agencies, and calls into question the public interest purpose of federal–local immi-
gration enforcement partnerships. 
 Punishment for Profi t: Immigrant Detention 
as Extractive Market Venture 
 In 2009, approximately 380,000 individuals were detained for some period of time 
in the custody of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Schriro,  2009 ). 
With lengths of stay averaging 30 days, the average daily population of immigrant 
detainees was 32,000 over the course of the year. These numbers give some indica-
tion of both the long and short-term historical dynamics at work in unauthorized 
immigrant detention: fi rst, the total number of detainees represents an approximate 
increase of 100,000 (36 %) over (prerecession) 2007 levels, and second, the average 
daily population of 32,000 represents an increase of nearly 427 % over the system’s 
 total capacity (in terms of bed space) as recently as 1995. The latter rate of growth 
parallels the exponential growth of America’s correctional infrastructure over a 
similar period. The parallels between the two systems are not limited to growth 
rates, but extend to conditions of confi nement as well: “the facilities that ICE uses 
to detain aliens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confi ne pretrial and 
sentenced felons” (Schriro,  2009 , p. 2). 
 Within the theoretical framework of the punitive economy of punishment, there 
is a clear logic to parallel conditions of confi nement for criminal felons and unau-
thorized (and thus criminal) immigrants; however, a number of unique factors also 
appear to be at work in the steady long-term and explosive short-term patterns of 
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growth in the immigrant detention infrastructure. Over the course of 2009, immi-
grant detainees could be found in over 300 separate facilities nationwide. However,
 Approximately 50 % of the detained population [was] held in 21 facilities. These include[d] 
seven Service Processing Centers (SPC) owned by ICE and  operated by the private sector ; 
seven dedicated Contract Detention Facilities (CDF)  owned and operated by the private 
sector ; and seven  dedicated county jail facilities, with which ICE maintains intergovern-
mental agency service agreements (IGSA) (Schriro,  2009 , p. 10; italics mine). 
 The prevalence of private sector and local government interests in the immigrant 
detention system indicates that economic context plays a role in setting conditions 
of detention for unauthorized immigrants; I argue that economic context is also 
essential to understanding state and local immigration enforcement policies. The 
 immigrant detention market is relatively small in dollar terms: ICE’s Offi ce of 
Detention and Removal Operations had a total operating budget of $2.6 billion in 
2009, as opposed to a conservative $4.4 billion “back-of-a-napkin” estimate for the 
unauthorized immigrant contribution to the value of US housing stock, 2 or $70 bil-
lion for the total annual operating budget of America’s county, state, and federal 
prisons combined (Schriro,  2009 , p. 6;  Wacquant,  2010b , p. 608). However, it is a 
market nonetheless, with multiple private interests and local governments applying 
market principles to their competition for contracts. The immigrant detention mar-
ket presents market actors with two extremely attractive conditions: the fi rst is an 
average per diem fee for detainees more than twice that paid for prisoner-clients 
from traditional criminal justice sources; the second is that the source of these fees 
is federal dollars, as opposed to the state and local tax-levy monies that generally 
pay for criminal justice system prisoners. 
 Though these conditions have different meanings for the private and government 
interests entering the market, clear evidence of this market logic in effect can be 
2  The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that unauthorized immigrants made up 17.1 % of the total 
construction workforce in 2008 (Passel & Cohn,  2009 ). Average prevailing wages for laborers in 
the American construction industry were $680 per week, versus $480 per week for foreign-born 
Hispanics, representing a savings of about 30 % on wages alone for those who employ them 
(Kochar,  2008 ). Several factors make the estimate of a 30 % savings an extremely conservative 
one: (1) unauthorized laborers may earn even less on average than foreign-born Hispanic workers 
as a whole; (2) employers of unauthorized immigrants have an increased potential for savings on 
various forms of insurance and through wage theft (Brownell,  2005 ; Carroll,  2010 ; Wishnie, 
 2007 ); and (3) the presence of unauthorized workers has a clear tendency to depress wages for 
authorized workers industry-wide. Although it is unlikely that the 17.1 % of construction laborers 
estimated to be unauthorized are spread evenly throughout the industry, it is no great leap to argue 
that their presence represents a 5 % savings on labor costs for the American construction industry 
as a whole. In 2008 (already well into the steep beginnings of the recession), the industry spent 
$296 billion to create $351billion in real estate value, in private residential construction alone (US 
Census Bureau,  2010 ). Using a construction-industry rule-of-thumb that labor costs represent 
25 % of total building costs, total labor costs for the private residential construction industry in 
2008 were something in the area of $74 billion; thus, we can make a conservative estimate of $3.7 
billion for the total labor savings represented by the employment of unauthorized construction 
workers, and $4.4 billion for the value, in reduced wages alone, that these workers added to the US 
private residential real estate stock in 2008. 
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found in the 2009 Annual Report of the single largest private corporation active in 
both the traditional corrections and immigrant detention markets, the Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA). Prepared for the company’s shareholders, and to 
fulfi ll statutory corporate governance requirements, annual reports by their nature 
must deal explicitly with issues of profi t and loss, risk, market activity, and market 
conditions. Among the illuminating statements and fi gures the corporation presents 
in this document is a “[r]evenue per compensated man-day” fi gure of $58.33—up 
94 cents from 2008s $57.39 average and representing an operating margin of $17.84, 
or 30.6 % (Corrections Corporation of America,  2010 , p. 32). This fi gure represents 
the average revenue across all of CCA’s areas of business, including contracts for 
state and federal prisoners, as well as US Marshals Service and ICE detainees. 
Thus, $58.33 is an artifi cially high estimate of the average per diem revenue poten-
tial for housing traditional prisoners. Even so, it is less than half the average of $122 
per day that ICE pays for detained immigrants ( Detention Watch Network, n.d. ). 
Even if we make the generous assumption that immigrant detainees are twice as 
expensive to house as traditional prisoners, they still represent a “clientele” with the 
potential to more than double CCA’s operating margin per compensated person- day, 
making the detention market an attractive one indeed. 
 The attractiveness of this market is enhanced, particularly in the context of the 
recent recession, by the fact that the Federal government, rather than state or local 
governments, pays the per diem fees for immigrant detainees. In its required market 
risk assessment, the CCA admits that “the budgetary constraints our state customers 
are experiencing will present challenges in obtaining per diem increases and addi-
tional inmate populations in the short-term” (Corrections Corporation of America, 
 2010 , p. 11). This concern is refl ected in the decline of CCA’s average compensated 
occupancy over the recession years, which moved from 98.2 % in 2007, to 95.5 % 
in 2008 and 90.7 % in 2009 (Corrections Corporation of America,  2010 , p. 15). 
Unconstrained by the balanced budget requirements in effect in the overwhelming 
majority of American states, the Federal government represents a vastly more reli-
able revenue source for private contractors, another factor making immigrant 
detainees a more attractive client base than traditional prisoners. For the county jails 
that also house a signifi cant proportion of immigrant detainees, the situation is simi-
lar. Faced with the task of paying off capital expenditures on jails built or expanded 
during years of rising incarceration, many counties and municipalities have found 
themselves trapped between falling crime rates and state-level policy initiatives to 
reduce incarceration; they may also have experienced signifi cantly reduced income 
during the recession from property taxes and other sources. Sheriffs and other 
county offi cials, from Jefferson County, Virginia, to Essex County, New Jersey, 
have discussed these issues publicly; in the latter case, Essex County offi cials com-
peted with private corporations in an open bidding process to build and operate a 
large-scale immigrant detention facility—a bid that the county ultimately won 
(Culli,  2009 ; Semple,  2011a ). It is clear that such detention contracts represent a 
steady and reliable revenue stream of Federal dollars to many local governments 
that need them—Federal dollars, moreover, that may serve additional political and 
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ideological functions in conservative-leaning locales. In this context, immigrant 
detainees are not simply an income source; they are a tangible prop upon which 
state and local politicians can establish both “tough on crime” and “anti-illegal 
immigration” bona fi des (Varsanyi,  2008 ). 
 At the state and local levels, however, both the economic and political benefi ts of 
immigrant detention are limited, to the extent that immigration enforcement actions 
and decisions about detainee movement are the purview of the Federal bureaucracy. 
Federal control places limits on the market activity of private interests as well, limit-
ing facility expansion to the federally determined level of enforcement, and limiting 
the ability of private interests to target local markets directly. In other words, it is not 
enough to simply expand detention operations in areas where there are populations 
of unauthorized immigrants necessary to sustain them; private interests must also 
leverage the popular political will to fi ll them. In a state such as Arizona, which 
fulfi lls both of these criteria, it is simply sound business practice for private interests 
to support the devolution of Federal control over immigration enforcement to the 
state and local governments. In a particularly illustrative example of the many forms 
this support might take, an October 2010 report by NPR’s Laura Sullivan details the 
Corrections Corporation of America’s involvement in the drafting and passage of 
Arizona’s now infamous SB1070. 3 CCA offi cials sit on the board of the American 
Legislative Exchange Council, where the idea for the bill was fi rst mooted by 
Arizona state Senator Russell Pearce, and where it was written, by committee, into 
a model bill. This “model legislation became, almost word for word, Arizona’s 
immigration law,” (Sullivan,  2010 ) after the CCA sent a new lobbyist to the Arizona 
capitol, and made campaign donations (along with other private prison companies) 
to 30 of the bills 36 co-sponsors. 
 As an attempt to place more control over immigration enforcement into the hands 
of state and local governments, Arizona’s SB1070 represents an extreme; as much an 
exercise in public ideological positioning as a practical policy effort (albeit one that 
a number of other state legislatures have recently emulated). Two other Federally 
sanctioned programs 4 emerged in the 1990s and 2000s to enable states, counties and 
municipalities to quietly take a signifi cant measure of control over immigration 
enforcement, without the public scrutiny and uncertainty that might accompany leg-
islative processes. The fi rst and older of these programs is the 287(g) program, 5 
named for the section of the 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act in which it was 
introduced. With the signing of a memorandum of agreement, the 287(g) program 
authorizes “state, county, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to enforce 
3  For an expanded discussion of the origins and legacies of Arizona’s State Bill 1070, see Chap.  2 . 
4  While additional programs, particularly ICE’s Criminal Alien Program (CAP), also result in the 
entry of numerous immigrants into the detention system, I limit my analysis to the Secure 
Communities and 287(g) programs because they entail signifi cant and clearly defi ned local control 
over specifi c aspects of the enforcement process. For a detailed discussion of the CAP program, 
please see Chap.  1 . 
5  Again, see Chap.  1 for a detailed history of the 287(g) program. 
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federal immigration law…[expanding] the federal government’s enforcement capac-
ities while enabling LEAs to respond directly to popular concerns regarding illegal 
immigration” ( Rodriguez, Chishti, Capps, & St. John,  2010 , p. 1). With $54.1 million 
in funding in 2009, the 287(g) program provides direct fi scal benefi ts to participating 
local law enforcement agencies in the forms of grants and salaries, as well as effec-
tively deputizing local police to perform the investigative and arrest functions of ICE 
agents. According to a 2009 US Government Accountability Offi ce report, however, 
“some participating agencies are using their 287(g) authority to process for removal 
aliens who have committed minor crimes, such as carrying an open container of 
alcohol” (United States Government Accountability Offi ce,  2009 , p. 4). Traffi c 
offenses and other violations that do not rise to the level of criminal misdemeanors 
are also sources of 287(g) arrests, 6 which accounted for 12 % (44,692) of admissions 
into the immigrant detention system in 2009. Of this total, 65 %, or 29,159 individual 
detainees, were classifi ed by ICE as “non-criminal” (Schriro,  2009 , p. 13). 
 The second program is the Secure Communities 7 program, launched in 2008. 
This program, slated for nationwide implementation by 2013 and funded at $200 
million annually, is squarely focused on state and local corrections rather than law 
enforcement agencies. The program enables “participating jails [to] submit arrest-
ees’ fi ngerprints not only to criminal databases, but to immigration databases as 
well; allowing ICE access to information on individuals held in jails” ( Waslin,  2010 , 
p. 3). Despite the program’s relative youth, it is clear that much of the recent increase 
in annual deportation fi gures can be attributed to its expanding coverage of state and 
local correctional agencies nationwide; it is equally clear that a signifi cant propor-
tion of Secure Communities detainees are non-criminal as well, and an even larger 
proportion have been convicted only of low-level misdemeanors. 8 In any case, 
Secure Communities provides correctional administrators with a means to poten-
tially recoup the cost of detaining criminal (and non-criminal) immigrants: once 
identifi ed as unauthorized (or otherwise subject to removal), detained immigrants 
may continue to be held in the same facilities while ICE initiates deportation 
proceedings. The only essential difference in the condition thereof confi nement is 
that it is now paid for by the Federal government, transforming the prisoner from a 
fi scal liability into a source of profi t. 
 Through detention, and the state and locally controlled immigration enforcement 
activities that lead to it, unauthorized immigrants (and other immigrants caught up 
in the system, regardless of their status) become the object of economic activity that 
is effectively  extractive in nature. In contrast to exploitative economic activity, 9 
which profi ts from unauthorized immigrants’ labor and the conditions of 
6  See Chaps.  1 ,  2 , and  3 for detailed discussions of detention and removal patterns under the 287(g) 
and Secure Communities programs. 
7  See Chap.  3 for a comprehensive history and accounting of the Secure Communities initiative. 
8  Pedroza provides exact fi gures in his contribution to this volume. 
9  For a detailed discussion of the labor market exploitation of unauthorized immigrants, see 
Chap.  13 . 
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uncertainty and vulnerability that keep unauthorized immigrant labor costs signifi -
cantly lower than those for native workers, extractive activity approaches immi-
grants as analogous to a natural resource: immigrants need only be present in order 
for the various interests involved in detention operations to profi t. 
 While it is clear that the profi t potential in extractive activity such as detention is 
dwarfed by the exploitative part of the fi eld—that is to say, it makes better economic 
sense, under most conditions, to employ unauthorized immigrant laborers at sub-
standard wages than it does to lock them up—the prevalence of extractive detention 
is contextually determined and operates in a complex relationship with exploitation 
and  exclusion (the systematic denial of economically implicated forms of social 
membership, and the resultant maintenance of unauthorized immigrants as perpet-
ual outsiders). Certainly, in keeping with the major theoretical propositions of the 
political economy of punishment, extractive detention serves a disciplinary func-
tion, discouraging unauthorized immigrants from appealing to offi cials in cases 
where exploitation edges into abuse; it also injects an element of fear into social 
service contacts, from schooling to health care, that encourages self-exclusion. 
Most importantly, however, for the purposes of the current analysis, extractive 
detention introduces a fl exibility that allows the fi eld as a whole to respond to 
changing social and economic conditions. It is extractive in nature primarily because 
it allows actors in the fi eld to extract profi t from social and economic shifts that 
might otherwise be considered roundly negative: in the current case, the twin social 
problems of the economic downturn, and overexpansion at all levels of the criminal 
justice infrastructure. 
 The recent economic recession has had a number of effects that might be expected 
to shift the balance between exploitative and extractive market activity: fi rst, the 
concentration of the downturn in the housing market led to a slowdown in construc-
tion and large-scale layoffs in the industry. It is reasonable to expect that such lay-
offs affected unauthorized immigrants to a degree proportional to their representation 
in the industry. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine whether 
and to what degree unemployed unauthorized immigrants represent an economic 
and social burden to their communities of residence, they clearly present signifi -
cantly reduced opportunities for economic exploitation. States and localities with 
immigration enforcement powers and a vested interest in (and established infra-
structure for) immigrant detention can manipulate enforcement in an effort to 
extract value from this surplus (i.e., unproductive and underexploited) unauthor-
ized immigrant population. This is not to say that the value thus extracted could 
match the potential value of labor exploitation; however, it stands to reason that 
some value is better than none; therefore, apprehending and processing unauthor-
ized immigrants through the detention and deportation infrastructure can be inter-
preted as an opportunity to “recoup costs”—an opportunity missed in the event that 
unauthorized immigrants voluntarily return to their countries of origin (or 
“self-deport”). 
 Second, sustained high unemployment amongst the citizen population is likely 
to increase the anxiety and resentment directed at unauthorized immigrants them-
selves, in that it throws off the balance between the benefi ts (in terms of lower costs 
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for a variety of goods and services) and detriments (in terms of labor competition 
and wage depression) that a given community’s unauthorized immigrants represent. 
Visible, stringent local enforcement leading to detention and deportation is a policy 
tool that allows state and local politicians to present themselves as proactively 
addressing their constituents’ anxiety and resentment toward unauthorized immi-
grants, in contrast to an (in the nativist narrative) unresponsive and reticent federal 
government. This policy tool carries the added benefi t of being business-friendly, in 
that it is focused squarely on the unauthorized immigrants themselves, provides 
businesses an additional means to manage and discipline unauthorized immigrant 
workers, and gives the appearance of addressing constituents’ economic concerns 
without raising labor costs or corporate taxes. 
 Finally, local immigration enforcement leading to detention provides a means to 
meliorate the many potential effects of the economic contraction on local criminal 
justice infrastructure. A reduction in the current scale of criminal justice incarceration 
carries enormous economic implications for most American states and many locali-
ties. Though the states that have undertaken, or are considering, such  reductions—
through means of a variety of policy shifts including early releases, changes in drug 
laws, and a renewed focus on community corrections—do so with an eye fi rmly on 
the ballooning share of deeply reduced state budgets taken up by corrections, the 
consequences will range from prison closures and reduced arrest rates, to layoffs of 
correctional and police offi cers. For communities that have come to depend on 
 carceral infrastructure in the face of dramatic declines in manufacturing and other 
productive industries, these consequences are likely to be economically devastating. 
The unions that represent correctional and police offi cers—and the public who sup-
ports them—will resist any reduction in ways that will be both politically and eco-
nomically costly, even if ultimately futile. While local immigration enforcement 
and detention are unlikely to ever serve as a full replacement for reduced arrests and 
reduced incarceration, again, they are clearly preferable if a total write-off is the 
only alternative. 
 Data and Methodology: An Empirical Test of the Political 
Economy of Punishment in Federal–Local Immigration 
Enforcement Partnerships 
 An empirical test of the political economy of punishment presents some unique 
challenges. Chief among these is the fragmentary nature of the policy decisions any 
such empirical test needs to incorporate, and the diffusion of the economic and 
political calculations that underlie them. The key question I attempt to address in 
this analysis is:  how, and to what extent, do macro-economic factors infl uence the 
scale of state and locally controlled immigration enforcement leading to detention? 
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that profi t motives exert a signifi cant infl u-
ence on state and local immigration enforcement and detention decision  making: 
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county offi cials, such as those in Essex County, New Jersey, who have entered a 
competitive bid to transform their local jail into a model immigrant detention center, 
have publicly addressed the economic motivations behind detention policy deci-
sions (Semple,  2011b , Plan to Upgrade New Jersey Jail Into Model for Immigrant 
Detention Centers). In contrast, disentangling and specifying the  economic motiva-
tions behind a county deputy’s decision to arrest an apparently unauthorized immi-
grant for loitering, and subsequently turn that arrestee over to the custody of ICE, 
cannot be presented as a linear process. Such a decision might be offi cially man-
dated by departmental rules; it might be an unwritten mandate of departmental cul-
ture; it might be motivated on a personal level by the deputy’s ideology, his general 
or specifi c sense of economic anxiety, his sense of duty, boredom or simply habit. 
 The political economy of punishment, however, is not intended to explain the 
micro-level decision-making of polities, politicians, and police, but to provide a 
framework—a “fi eld”—in which certain decisions regarding immigration enforce-
ment and detention make economic sense. Any given arrest of a (suspected) unau-
thorized immigrant may be motivated by duty, by racism, by habit, or by some 
combination of all three; to the extent that the arrest leads to direct economic ben-
efi ts for a particular corporation or polity, and secondary economic benefi ts for 
stockholders, employees, or citizens, it indicates the theory in operation. Testing the 
theory must therefore be a two-step process: fi rst, to determine whether the political 
economy of punishment operates through the mechanisms that I have specifi ed 
above, and second, to determine whether it operates as predicted in the extractive 
detention of unauthorized (and other) immigrants. The present test takes US states 
as its unit of analysis, and examines cross-sectional correlations of 2009 data. It 
must be acknowledged that both the cross-sectional nature of this analysis, and its 
reliance on state-level data, place serious limitations on the validity of any causal 
inference that might be drawn from them. The clear possibility that wider variation 
might exist at the county or municipal level within states than between them, is lost 
with a state-by-state comparison. Cross-sectional analysis, of course, can only 
detect correlation rather than causation; in addition, it gives no sense of temporal 
order or change over time. Nevertheless, a cross-sectional analysis of state-level 
data is appropriate in the current context, for a number of reasons:
 1.  The current analysis represents the fi rst empirical test of the political economy of 
othering in immigrant detention. As such, a broad overview of the phenomenon 
will support the subsequent development of more sophisticated analyses. 
 2.  The theory is presented in this paper within the context of ongoing, contempo-
rary social forces and policy decisions—the Secure Communities program, for 
example, incorporated as a dependent variable below, was introduced in 2008; 
the “Great Recession,” treated herein at length, offi cially began in December of 
2007 (National Bureau of Economic Research,  2008 ), and was only recently 
declared to have ended. Many data that would give some indication of change-
over-time in these and related variables are simply not yet available. 
 3.  Many of the policy decisions under examination herein take place at the state 
level (e.g., correctional policy, budgetary policy, criminal codes, etc.). State- level 
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policy making creates the framework within which local policy decisions must 
be made, making local-level policy decisions (in the current analysis, the deci-
sion to enter into a 287(g) agreement or the speed with which to implement the 
Secure Communities program) arguably the more reactive of the two, and thus 
refl ective of statewide conditions. 
 Given these considerations, a cross-sectional analysis of state-level data should 
provide a useful overview of the operational fi eld of the political economy of pun-
ishment as it applies to extractive detention in the USA. Within the fi eld, I expect to 
see three factors affect the scale of extractive detention: 
 Factor 1: Market Scale 
 As the name implies, extractive market activity treats unauthorized immigrants as 
analogous to natural resources: it requires only that they be present and accessible 
as the passive object of the extractive forces involved. As such, no extraction can 
Market Scale
- Total population of
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take place where the natural resource is (1) unavailable; (2) in such limited supply 
or so inaccessible as to render extraction unprofi table; or (3) directly or indirectly 
involved in other economic activity that is more profi table than the extractive pro-
cess planned. Mining corporations do not mine coal where there is no coal, where 
they cannot turn a profi t on it, or where it sits beneath prime residential real estate; 
similarly, immigrant detention cannot operate as an extractive process where few or 
no unauthorized immigrants are present, where they are diffi cult to locate and to 
draw into extractive processes (i.e., to arrest and detain), or where they are more 
profi tably subjected to the exploitative activity of the labor market. Accordingly, I 
have selected three variables to stand as proxies for the state-level scale of the 
potential available immigrant market extractive detention: the state’s  total popula-
tion of unauthorized immigrants , the  percentage of the state’s population made up 
of non-citizens , and the  percentage of the state’s labor force made up of unauthor-
ized immigrants .
 The state’s total population of unauthorized immigrants straightforwardly repre-
sents the total potential extractive profi t—its total reserves, to extend the natural 
resource metaphor. Texas, for example, has an estimated population of 1.65 million 
unauthorized immigrants; Alaska has less than 10,000 (Passel & Cohn,  2011 ). 
Given an average of $122 per day in fees and an average stay in detention of 30 
days, Texas’ unauthorized immigrant population represents a potential extractive 
value of $6 billion, versus less than $37 million for Alaska; viewed in this light, it is 
only logical that Texas should host signifi cantly more extractive activity than 
Alaska. The latter two proxy variables—the percentage of the state’s population 
made up of non-citizens and the percentage of the state’s labor force made up of 
unauthorized immigrants—are intended to represent accessibility and exploitative 
involvement, respectively. The accessibility of unauthorized immigrants is linked 
closely to visibility: the higher the visibility of unauthorized immigrants, the more 
likely they are to come into day-to-day contact with law enforcement offi cers and 
the citizen population alike. I use the non-citizen percentage of the population rather 
than the unauthorized percentage, because the markers that law enforcement offi -
cials and the citizen population likely use to identify unauthorized immigrants—
racial characteristics, language use, cultural displays—do not distinguish between 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants. Lastly, the percentage of unauthorized 
immigrants in the state’s labor force represents a sort of saturation point for unau-
thorized immigrants’ labor participation: as I have outlined above, exploitative mar-
ket activity is likely to be signifi cantly more profi table than extractive activity. As 
unauthorized immigrant participation in the labor market rises, however, native 
workers’ awareness of the competition they represent is likely to rise with it. Though 
tolerance levels for unauthorized immigrants’ labor force participation may vary 
from state to state, I proceed on the assumption that the acceptability of detention as 
a disciplinary tool and a salve to the anxieties of native workers rises proportionally 
with unauthorized immigrants’ labor force participation. 
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 Factor 2: Punitive Economy 
 This factor attempts to capture the scale of the state’s established correctional 
 infrastructure into which immigrant detainees are drawn—in effect, the capital 
already present in the state to be invested in extractive detention. However, because 
correctional incarceration is a market-involved activity (as opposed to an expressly 
profi t- driven, free-market activity) there is a need for variables that refl ect the 
breadth and depth of incarceration’s involvement in the state’s economy. 
Accordingly, I have chosen to use the state’s  incarceration rate per 100,000 popula-
tion , to  provide an indirect measure of per-capita economic involvement with the 
criminal justice economy statewide. For local government offi cials, this may stand 
in for the impact of criminal justice investment and employment on their local econ-
omy and tax base; for individual voters, it is intended to represent the likelihood and 
the likely extent of their direct and indirect benefi t from criminal justice employ-
ment and other aspects of the criminal justice economy. Finally, in order to repre-
sent the effects of direct market decision-making and political infl uence from private 
corrections corporations, I include the  incarceration rate in privately operated 
facilities per 100,000 population statewide. The higher the per-capita private incar-
ceration rate, the broader the economic impact (and the stronger the political infl u-
ence) of decisions taken by private corrections corporations is likely to be. 
 Factor 3: Market Pressure 
 Whereas the market scale for extractive othering represents the long-term economic 
viability of extractive detention activity in the state, market pressure represents the 
short-term push–pull factors that should be expected to (1) push unauthorized immi-
grants out of the labor market and the more profi table exploitative area of the fi eld; 
and (2) pull these immigrants (as detainees) into the existing criminal justice infra-
structure. Short-term fl uctuations in the labor market—represented here by the 
proxy variable of the state’s  offi cial unemployment rate —can generally be expected 
to affect unauthorized workers proportionally. Secondarily, they may also lead to 
heightened short-term anxiety on the part of the state’s native workers, affecting 
voting patterns and political support for local enforcement and detention accord-
ingly. Conversely, short-term fl uctuations in the activity of the state’s criminal jus-
tice infrastructure—represented by  the year-on-year percentage change in the 
state ’ s incarceration rate per 100,000 —should be expected to relate negatively to 
support for local enforcement and detention efforts. That is, where incarceration is 
dropping, state and local offi cials will be exploring alternative means to fi ll empty 
cells and preserve the positive primary and secondary economic impact that crimi-
nal justice institutions bring to local communities—and they may well be supported 
in these efforts by law enforcement and correctional offi cers unions, as well as other 
economically motivated advocacy groups. A third variable— the proportion of the 
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state ’ s unauthorized immigrant population not participating in the labor force —
serves a dual role within this factor, fi rst complementing the “pull” factor of unem-
ployment, and second, representing the proportion of unauthorized dependents (and 
other individuals not participating in the labor force) who can be drawn into extrac-
tive market activity without any net effect on potential exploitative activity. 
 Factor 4: (Dependent) Local Enforcement and Detention 
 Given the theoretical construction of independent proxy variables into broader 
underlying factors, it is both conceptually and methodologically appropriate to treat 
the dependent variables of interest in a similar fashion. Detention itself— represented 
by  the state ’ s average daily population of detainees —is, within the theoretical 
framework of the political economy of punishment, the benefi t-producing end of 
any local enforcement initiative; however, given that its distribution remains subject 
to federal enforcement decision-making and activity, it is by itself an imperfect 
measure of state-level local enforcement scale. It is supplemented here through the 
inclusion of  the state ’ s raw number of active 287(g) memoranda of understanding, 
and  the proportion of the state ’ s criminal justice jurisdictions actively participating 
in the Secure Communities Program . 
 Factor analysis presents the most appropriate statistical technique to test for the 
presence of, and relationships amongst, these factors within the current 50-state 
data set. Theoretically and conceptually, it is uniquely suited to revealing the under-
lying contextual patterns and associations that should set the fi eld for extractive 
detention; methodologically, it serves to standardize a set of variables that are, in 
their raw forms, expressed in disparate and diffi cult to reconcile terms (from raw 
populations and proportions to rates and averages). Additionally, oblique (oblimin) 
factor analysis reveals the correlations between these underlying factors. This in 
effect holds the other factors constant—an essential feature where the variables of 
interest have highly skewed distributions and a high prevalence of zeros that render 
traditional OLS regression unfeasible  (Table  1 ).
 Findings, Part 1: Factor Analysis 
 Table  2 presents the relevant statistics for the factor analysis of variables expected 
to predict the scale of extractive detention. In general, the analysis provides strong 
support for the presence of the factors outlined above, and the distribution of vari-
ables within each factor supports the theoretical specifi cations of the political econ-
omy of punishment. The model explains 71 % of the total variance amongst the 
eight variables included, and with complete data from all 50 US states, the analysis 
fi ts well within the widely accepted tolerance of 5–20 cases per variable. In addition, 
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 Table 2  Factor loadings for variables implicated in extractive othering 
 Code  Variable 
 Loading 
 Factor 1: 
market scale 
 Factor 2: 
punitive 
economy 
 Factor 3: 
market 
pressure 
 undocpop  Total population of unauthorized immigrants  0.844 
 noncitperc  Non-citizens as a proportion of total population  0.955 
 undoclabpc  Unauthorized immigrants as a proportion of 
total labor force 
 0.943 
 unemp  Proportion of labor force unemployed  0.780 
 incchg  Proportional year-on-year change in prison 
population 
 −0.726 
 undocdeppc  Proportion of unauth. pop. not participating in 
labor force 
 0.680 
 incperk  Incarceration rate per 100,000 population  0.847 
 privrtperk  Incarceration rate in private facilities per 
100,000 population 
 0.732 
 Eigenvalue  2.865  1.571  1.279 
 % of variance  35.811  19.638  15.991 




 Component correlation matrix 
 Factor 1: market scale  1.000  0.064  0.167 
 Factor 2: punitive economy  0.064  1.000  −0.035 
 Factor 3: market pressure  0.167  −0.035  1.000 
 Table 1  Descriptive statistics for variables of interest, 50 US states, 2009 
 Variable  Mean  SD  Min.  Max. 
 Market scale 
  Total population of unauthorized immigrants 
(in thousands) 
 228  434  10  2,550 
 Non-citizens as a proportion of total population  0.048  0.032  0.007  0.146 
  Unauthorized immigrants as a proportion 
of total labor force 
 0.038  0.024  0.005  0.100 
 Market pressure 
 Proportion of labor force unemployed  0.085  0.020  0.043  0.133 
  Proportional year-on-year change 
in prison population 
 0.001  0.030  −0.092  0.054 
  Proportion of unauthorized population 
not participating in labor force 
 0.246  0.122  0.000  0.430 
 Punitive economy 
 Incarceration rate per 100 thousand population  409  147  151  866 
  Incarceration rate in private facilities 
per 100 thousand population 
 40.3  58.5  0  194 
 Local enforcement and detention 
 Average daily population of detained immigrants  673  1,421  0  8,809 
  Total number of 287(g) memoranda 
of understanding 
 1.32  2.24  0  9 
  Proportion of jurisdiction with active Secure 
Communities programs 
 0.032  0.083  0.000  0.470 
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the factors are largely distinct, with the highest correlation (0.167) arising between 
the market scale and market pressure factors, and a minuscule negative correlation 
(−0.035) between the market pressure and punitive economy factors.
 This implies that the normal scores for each state on the three factors are gener-
ally uncorrelated, and can thus be used to further analyze their correlation with the 
dependent variable of interest (local enforcement and detention), with confi dence 
that each factor represents the distinct aspect of the theory specifi ed. As for the 
individual variables included in the model, the smallest absolute loading is 0.680, 
indicating that the factor (market pressure) explains 68 % of total variance in the 
variable, in this case the proportion of the state’s unauthorized immigrant popula-
tion not participating in the labor force. 
 Table  3 presents the factor loadings for the dependent variable of interest, local 
enforcement and detention. While the amount of variance in the three constituent 
variables explained by the factor—66.6 %—is less than the 71 % explained by the 
factors in the fi rst model, it is clear that this larger variance is driven by the degree 
to which local enforcement initiatives (loading at 0.778 and 0.755, respectively) are 
out of step with detention itself (loading at 0.907). This variance can likely be 
explained by two distinct circumstances: fi rst, the degree to which entry into a 
287(g) agreement may be ideologically driven, economically speculative, or driven 
by the promise of enforcement-side economic rewards. Law enforcement offi cials 
in counties and municipalities with very low populations of unauthorized immi-
grants might enter into 287(g) for the free trainings and in-kind subsidies that such 
agreements carry, without the agreement leading to a notable increase in the state or 
local population of detained immigrants. Secondly, the relative youth of the Secure 
Communities Program—and the fact that many jurisdictions did not enter the pro-
gram until late in 2009—means that the program itself would be unlikely to be 
signifi cantly related to an increase in the population of detained immigrants until 
2010 or later. Given these issues, the 66.6 % association of detention and local 
enforcement variables implies that the factor is a viable dependent variable for 
further analysis.
 Table 3  Factor loadings for dependent variables: local enforcement and detention 
 Code  Variable 
 Loading 
 Factor 1: local enforcement 
and detention 
 detadp  Average daily population of detained 
immigrants 
 0.907 
 gmoacount  Count of 287(g) memoranda of understanding  0.778 
 activscperc  Proportion of jurisdictions with Secure 
Communities programs 
 0.755 
 Eigenvalue  1.999 
 % of variance  66.617 
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 Table 4  Extractive economic othering: mean variable values by factor score pentile 
 Variable 
 Factor score pentile 
 1 (lowest)  2  3  4  5 (highest) 
 Market scale 
 Total population of unauthorized 
immigrants (in thousands) 
 23.5  85.5  67.5 a  162  801.5 
 Non-citizens as a proportion 
of total population 
 0.0168  0.0246  0.0389  0.0631  0.0971 
 Unauthorized immigrants as a 
proportion of total labor force 
 0.0105  0.0224  0.0327  0.0481  0.0748 
 Market pressure 
 Proportion of labor force unemployed  0.0692  0.0718  0.0813  0.0954  0.1048 
 Proportional year-on-year change 
in prison population 
 0.025  0.0123  0.0137 a  −0.0117  −0.0325 
 Proportion of unauthorized population 
not participating in labor force 
 0.0446  0.2653  0.3187  0.2739 a  0.3274 
 Punitive economy 
 Incarceration rate per 100 thousand 
population 
 226.3  353.4  434.8  448.8  580.5 
 Incarceration rate in private facilities 
per 100 thousand population 
 1.67  7.21  13.82  65.82  112.8 
 Local enforcement and detention 
 Average daily population of detained 
immigrants 
 14  135  354  516  2,348 
 Total number of 287(g) memoranda 
of understanding 
 0 b  0.1  0.7  1.5  4.3 
 Proportion of jurisdiction with active 
Secure Communities programs 
 0.0 b  0.001  0.002  0.018  0.138 
 a Denotes a deviation from ordinal scale on the mean value of this variable by pentile rank, due to 
variance in this factor not explained by the model presented 
 b Values of this variable for all cases in pentile one are 0 
 Findings, Part 2: Crosstabular Correlations 
 As discussed above, the non-normal distributions and the prevalence of null values 
in both the independent and dependent variables included in the model make mea-
suring association through standard OLS regression unfeasible. As an alternative, 
each factor has been divided into pentile ranks, the mean values for individual vari-
ables of which are shown in Table  4 . The categorical ranks of each independent 
factor are then crosstabulated separately with the rank-ordered local enforcement 
factor, and tested with (1) Fisher’s exact test to measure signifi cance; and (2) 
Cramer’s V and (3) Kendall’s tau-b as measures of association. Fisher’s exact test 
is used rather than a standard chi-square, because the observed-expected values in a 
great many cells are less than 5; as such, an exact test can be interpreted with much 
greater confi dence than an asymptotic estimate. Cramer’s V provides a measure of 
the raw (nominal) association of the two variables examined (in other words, the 
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 Table 5  Crosstabular correlations of ranked extractive economic othering factors with ranked 
local enforcement factor 
 Independent 
factor variable 
 Fisher’s exact test  Cramer’s V  Kendall’s tau-b 
 Statistic  Signifi cance  Value  Signifi cance  Value  Signifi cance 
 Market scale  33.841  0.000  0.469  0.000  0.558  0.000 a 
 Punitive economy  23.147  0.051  0.354  0.075  0.217  0.071 a 
 Market pressure  41.008  0.000  0.520  0.000  0.220  0.056 a 
 a Approximate signifi cance (exact signifi cance could not be computed with available memory) 
strength of the relationship regardless of direction), and Kendall’s tau-b measures 
the directional association of the ranked factors (the degree to which one factor rises 
and falls with the other).
 Table  5 reveals clear support for the political economy of punishment in locally 
controlled immigration enforcement leading to detention; specifi cally, the tests 
appear to indicate that macro-economic factors infl uence the scale of these opera-
tions at the state level, lending support to the extractive interpretation outlined 
above. Signifi cant relationships are found between each of the three macro- economic 
factors and the local enforcement and detention factor. Additionally, the Kendall’s 
tau-b statistics show a strong linear relationship between market scale and local 
enforcement, and weak-to-moderate linear relationships (signifi cant at the 0.1 level) 
between local enforcement rank and the other two ranked factors (Table  6 ).
 The strength and signifi cance of these correlations shows that the relative scale of 
each factor as constructed has some relationship with the relative scale of locally 
controlled immigration enforcement in a given US state. The limitations of the statis-
tical instruments do not allow for a comprehensive exploration of how the indepen-
dent factors act upon local control in tandem; nor can they test the interactions 
between factors, or their relative weight in infl uencing local enforcement policy. They 
do, however, present a clear argument for the consideration of economic  context—
specifi cally, the potential for direct extractive profi t in place of labor-market exploita-
tion, and the evolving economic role of the criminal justice system—when predicting 
and analyzing state and local level immigration enforcement decisions. 
 Discussion: Policy Innovation, Harm, and the Public Good 
 The above analysis establishes a clear empirical relationship between state-level 
local enforcement and detention activity, and the pursuit of direct economic benefi t 
through this activity by corporate and local government actors. In doing so, it raises 
the fundamental question of whether, and to what extent, economic decision- making 
has a justifi able role in immigration policy. Numerous justifi cations have been cited 
for the increasingly aggressive detention and deportation policies of recent years, as 
well as for the increasing pace at which enforcement functions are being rescaled to 
the state and local level; the offi cial justifi cation for the federally mandated 287(g) 
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and Secure Communities programs is to allow local law enforcement and correc-
tional agencies to be more responsive to the “problem” of unauthorized immigration 
at the local level, and to act as a “force multiplier” in pursuit of a solution. Such a 
justifi cation frames detention and deportation as an intrinsic public good, that can 
be made responsive to local needs. To the extent that such rescaling facilitates the 
concentration of economic benefi ts within a more or less narrowly circumscribed 
community within the locality in question, this justifi cation is perhaps defensible—
provided the explicit acknowledgement that such a defense requires a straightfor-
wardly exclusionary redefi nition of the “public,” nakedly privileging the economic 
concerns of that locality’s political and social establishment over the quality of life 
(and freedom) of those others who may live in the community, but are not  of it, 
those outsiders upon whose labor a signifi cant proportion of the community’s 
wealth may be built. 10 
 A more broadly defi ned and inclusive notion of the public good, when consider-
ing the protective functions of the state, requires the contrasting notion of a specifi c 
 harm against which the public must be protected. The notion that unauthorized 
immigration represents such a harm is a debatable one; whatever one’s stance in this 
debate, however, it is clear that the movement of labor across borders is treated very 
differently from the parallel movement of capital, with which it is in fact inextrica-
bly intertwined (Massey,  2009 ; Stageman,  2011 ). It is important to acknowledge 
that the ramping up of deportation to record-breaking levels year upon year has now 
become a phenomenon untethered to the reality of these cross-border movements; 
with only an estimated 300,000 immigrants crossing the nation’s southern land bor-
der without authorization, deportations in 2009 outstripped unauthorized entries by 
as much as 100,000 (Passel & Cohn,  2010 ). This difference has only grown in the 
years since. 
 If such a trajectory continues, the typical character of deportations will change 
markedly in the coming years, as the pool of newly arrived unauthorized immi-
grants shrinks, and the average deportee becomes a progressively longer-term resi-
dent. The potential collateral effects of tearing such individuals from their partners, 
children, extended families, and social networks has been explored in heartrending 
detail by other contributors to this volume, 11 indicating the clear social cost of deten-
tion and deportation operations—a cost that can only rise as the years pass. These 
are costs for which the market consistently fails to account. As scholars, however, 
we are uniquely positioned to quantify these costs, to describe them, and to contrast 
them with a market logic concerned chiefl y with innovating in the pursuit of profi ts, 
no matter how narrowly held or bereft of social benefi t. 
10  For an in-depth discussion of the quality-of-life effects of this legally imposed outsider status on 
immigrant communities, Hagan & Phillips,  2008 ). 
11  Specifi cally, Fenix Arias (Chap.  6 ) details the social costs for family members left behind, while 
Yolanda Martin’s (Chap.  5 ) focuses on the steep costs for deportees themselves. 
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